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INTRODUCTION 
Automated risk assessment is the trendy model in the criminal 
justice system.1 Proponents view risk assessment as an objective and 
reasonable way to reduce mass incarceration without sacrificing public 
safety.2 Professor Christopher Slobogin refers to the practice as 
“preventive justice.”3 Officials thus are becoming heavily invested in 
risk assessment tools — along with their reliance upon big data and 
algorithmic processing — to inform decisions on managing offenders 
according to their risk profiles.4 
Nonetheless, a public debate on the topic emerged when the 
investigative journalist group ProPublica recently proclaimed that a 
popular risk tool called COMPAS was racially biased.5 Analyzing 
COMPAS’s performance on a large dataset, ProPublica found that 
blacks who did not reoffend “are almost twice as likely as whites to be 
labeled a higher risk,” while whites who reoffended “are much more 
likely than blacks to be labeled lower risk.”6 In statistical terms, these 
results mean that the tool produced higher false positive rates for 
blacks and higher false negative rates for whites. 
Prominent news sites highlighted ProPublica’s message that this 
proved yet again an area in which criminal justice outcomes were 
racist, even despite using a mathematical algorithm.7 COMPAS’s 
 
 1 J. Stephen Wormith, Automated Offender Risk Assessment: The Next Generation or 
a Black Hole?, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 281, 281 (2017). 
 2 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1490 (2019) (providing a background on criminal justice 
advancements, and analyzing, as well as advocating, empirically based approaches to 
adopting policy). 
 3 Christopher Slobogin, Preventive Justice: A Paradigm in Need of Testing, BEHAV. 
SCI. L. 1, 1 (2018). 
 4 See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L. J. 1147, 1149 (2017) (“Today’s 
algorithms are digital ‘robots’ that possess effectively autonomous abilities to adopt 
and learn”; a “type of artificial intelligence.”). See generally Nathan James, Cong. Res. 
Serv., Risk and Needs Assessment in the Criminal Justice System (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc795663/m1/1/high_res_d/R44087_20
15Oct13.pdf.  
 5 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.  
 6 Id. 
 7 E.g., Li Zhou, Is Your Software Racist?, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2018, 5:05 AM), https:// 
www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/algorithmic-bias-software-recommendations-
000631 (discussing, in part, how racially based bad data creates racially based bad 
algorithms); Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crime than Random 
People, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
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corporate owner, Northpointe, denied the allegations, stating that its 
reanalysis of the dataset ProPublica used led to the contrary 
conclusion: the tool was unbiased as blacks and whites had similar 
positive predictive values for recidivism.8 
This debate is credited with sparking a movement to promote 
algorithmic fairness.9 As a recent illustration, a consortium of over 100 
legal organizations, government watchdog groups, and minority rights 
associations (e.g., ACLU, NAACP, and Electronic Frontier 
Foundation) signed onto “A Shared Statement of Civil Rights 
Concerns.” In doing so, they were expressing unease that algorithmic 
tools may create disparate impact based on race or other protected 
characteristics.10 
The ProPublica/Northpointe racial bias debate, and the broader 
issue of algorithmic fairness, present significant dilemmas for criminal 
justice officials, legal practitioners, data scientists, and policymakers. 
There remains significant opportunity to influence and 
manage the development of computer technology, to ensure 
that ethics and law are part of the curriculum of software 
developers and analysts, and to regulate as necessary. 
However, the development of big data, computer-assisted 
decision-making, and e-regulation present serious challenges 
 
2018/01/equivant-compas-algorithm/550646/ (discussing how in one such study from 
Dartmouth College, “COMPAS [was] no better at predicting an individual’s risk of 
recidivism than random volunteers recruited from the internet”); Max Ehrenfreund, The 
Machines that Could Rid Courtrooms of Racism, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/18/why-a-computer-program-
that-judges-rely-on-around-the-country-was-accused-of-racism/?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.ce854f237cfe (discussing the paradox of how “[s]ystemic racial injustices can be 
reflected in software that holds the promise of greater equality”); NPR, The Hidden 
Discrimination in Criminal Risk-Assessment Scores (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/05/24/479349654/the-hidden-discrimination-in-criminal-risk-
assessment-scores (discussing, via the program All Things Considered, how “[c]ourtrooms 
across the country are increasingly using a defendant’s “risk assessment score” to help 
make decisions about bond, parole and sentencing”).  
 8 William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and 
Predictive Parity, NORTHPOINTE INC. RES. DEP’T (July 8, 2016), http://go. 
volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf.  
 9 Chelsea Barabas et al., Interventions over Predictions: Reframing the Ethical Debate for 
Actuarial Risk Assessment, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 1 (2018), 
proceedings.mlr.press/v81/barabas18a/barabas18a.pdf; Thomas Miconi, The Impossibility of 
“Fairness”: A Generalized Impossibility Result for Decisions 3 (Sep. 11, 2017), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d883/b155d1ce19672cdf49795ea1a63acc923ad5.pdf.  
 10 African American Ministers in Action et al., The Use of Pretrial “Risk 
Assessment” Instruments: A Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns 9-10 (2018), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf. 
  
2019] Debating Algorithmic Fairness 265 
to the rule of law, equality, and natural justice, and the poor 
understanding and transparency of software development 
means that this requires serious attention from those who 
research, teach, and practice law.11 
This paper addresses these concerns with a mixed-methods 
empirical project to inform legal practitioners and data scientists on 
some of these difficult challenges. The Article proceeds as follows. Part 
I summarizes the background for the study. A focal point is to 
investigate how ProPublica and Northpointe came to such contrasting 
conclusions, despite studying the use of a single tool with the same 
dataset. 
Part II introduces the methodology. The qualitative component 
engages a critical discourse analytic approach to adjudicate the debate. 
The discursive argumentation here involves two powerful groups. 
ProPublica has access to public influence as a media outlet, while 
Northpointe is a machine-learning company which lends itself to 
scientific cachet. Each may be strategically attempting to control the 
wider understandings of the utility and parity of algorithmic risk 
assessment. Part II also describes the dataset that is mined in order to 
offer a quantitative supplement. ProPublica and Northpointe have 
utilized only a few of the algorithmic fairness measures that data 
scientists and legal experts now advance. Thus, the statistical offering 
to this debate includes computing several of these alternative 
equations to supply additional evidence as to the potential for racial 
bias in the COMPAS risk tool. To do this, we use the same dataset 
again so that any differentials are not due to discrepancies in sample/
population profiles. 
Part III relays the results of the qualitative analysis, followed by the 
quantitative supplement. The information therein unpacks the 
ProPublica/Northpointe dispute in terms of its contrasting verdicts. 
Several algorithmic fairness measures the parties ignore are identified 
and computed. Part III acts as a third-party audit and a window into 
 
 11 Rónán Kennedy, Algorithms and the Rule of Law, 17 LEG. INFO. MGMT. 170, 172 
(2017).  
While far from a panacea, data mining can and should be part of a panoply 
of strategies for combating discrimination . . . and for promoting fair 
treatment and equality. Ideally, institutions can find ways to use data mining 
to generate new knowledge and improve decision making that serves the 
interests of both decision makers and protected classes.  
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 
732 (2016).  
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transparency regarding a popular algorithmic risk tool. Independent 
conclusions are rendered as to the potential for disparate impact with 
respect to race. 
I. STUDY BACKGROUND 
Risk assessment in criminal justice entails predicting an individual’s 
potential for recidivism in the future.12 Predictions have long 
contributed to criminal justice decision-making as serving the 
legitimate goal of protecting the public from those who have been 
identified as offenders.13 Historically, risk predictions typically relied 
upon instinct or the limited personal experience of the official 
responsible for making the relevant decision.14 A wave of more 
empirically informed risk assessment tools has emerged, aided by 
advances in behavioral sciences, the availability of big data, and 
improvements in statistical modeling. 
A. The New Wave Risk Assessment in Criminal Justice 
The “evidence-based practices movement” is the now popular term 
to describe the turn to behavioral sciences data to improve risk-based 
classifications.15 Scientific studies targeting recidivism outcomes are 
benefiting from the compilation of large datasets (i.e., big data) of 
discharged offenders. Researchers track the offenders post-release, 
observe recidivism rates, and then statistically test which factors 
correlate with recidivism.16 Risk assessment tool developers use 
computer modeling to combine factors of sufficiently high correlation 
and weight them accordingly using increasingly complex algorithms.17 
 
 12 Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 
52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 232 (2015). 
 13 Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating 
Risk Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 
707, 724-25 (2011). 
 14 Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 556 (2015). 
 15 Faye S. Taxman, The Partially Clothed Emperor: Evidence-Based Practices, 34 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 97, 97-98 (2018). 
 16 Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Algorithmic Risk Governance: Big Data Analytics, Race and 
Information Activism in Criminal Justice Debates, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY (March 22, 
2018), https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480618763582. 
 17 An algorithm refers to “computation procedures (which can be more or less 
complex) drawing on some type of digital data (‘big’ or not) that provide some kind of 
quantitative output (be it a single score or multiple metrics) through a software 
program.” Angéle Christin, Algorithms in Practice: Comparing Web Journalism and 
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Broadly speaking, “[d]ata-driven algorithmic decision making may 
enhance overall government efficiency and public service delivery, by 
optimizing [bureaucratic] processes, providing real-time feedback and 
predicting outcomes.”18 With such a statistical tool in hand, criminal 
justice officials can more consistently input relevant data and receive 
software-produced risk classifications.19 
The utility of risk instruments has attracted energetic support from 
reputable policy centers and been the subject of various legislative 
policy proposals as a driver of criminal justice reform.20 News 
headlines and academic literature have also been expounding upon the 
benefits generated by the government’s use of big data to predict the 
future risk posed by individuals.21 Algorithmic risk assessment tools 
offer the ability to reduce mass incarceration by diverting low-risk 
defendants from prison, while targeting greater supervision and 
services to those at higher risk.22 
Many parties presume that algorithmic risk assessment tools 
developed on big data epitomize transparent, consistent, and logical 
methods for classifying offenders.23 The mathematical character of risk 
assessment suggests the ability to quantify the future and transport it 
into the present.24 Evidence-based practices thereby present a welcome 
displacement of human instinct.25 
 
Criminal Justice, BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 2 (July–Dec. 2017), http://journals.sagepub. 
com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951717718855. 
 18 Bruno Lepri et al., Fair, Transparent, and Accountable Algorithmic Decision-
Making Processes, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 611, 611-12 (2018), www.nuriaoliver.com/papers/ 
Philosophy_and_Technology_final.pdf. 
 19 Wormith, supra note 1, at 285. 
 20 See Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 57 (2018). See generally 
James, supra note 4. 
 21 E.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 327, 407 (2015); Crysta Jentile & Michelle Lawrence, How Government Use 
of Big Data Can Harm Communities, FORD FOUND. (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/how-government-use-of-
big-data-can-harm-communities/; Sony Kassam, Legality of Using Predictive Data to 
Determine Sentences Challenged in Wisconsin Supreme Court Case, A.B.A. J. (June 27, 2016, 
1:07 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legality_of_using_predictive_data_ 
to_determine_sentences_challenged_in_wisc.  
 22 Sarah L. Desmarais et al., Performance of Recidivism Risk Assessment Instruments 
in U.S. Correctional Settings, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 206, 206-07 (2016). 
 23 Hyatt et al., supra note 13, at 725.  
 24 M. Roffey & S.Z. Kaliski, To Predict or Not to Predict — That Is the Question, 15 
AFR. J. PSYCHIATRY 227, 227 (2012).  
 25 Alfred Blumstein, Some Perspectives on Quantitative Criminology Pre-JQC: and 
Then Some, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 549, 554 (2010).  
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Nonetheless, concerns have arisen whether algorithmic tools are as 
fair as expected, particularly concerning the potential for disparate 
impact on protected groups.26 An important instigator is a report 
released in 2016 that identified a widely used software risk tool as 
producing racist predictions. 
B. Competing Claims Concerning the Racist Algorithm 
Investigative news journalists with the nonprofit ProPublica 
reported on statistical analyses the group had conducted involving a 
real dataset and a popular risk tool named COMPAS — the acronym 
for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions. ProPublica investigators obtained (through Freedom of 
Information Act requests) the data on over 7,000 arrestees who were 
scored on COMPAS in a pretrial setting in a southern county of 
Florida.27 These scores had previously been provided to judges as 
evidence to consider when ruling on pretrial release for individual 
arrestees.28 ProPublica concluded COMPAS was racist in that its 
algorithm produced a much higher false positive rate for blacks than 
whites (45% versus 24%, respectively), meaning that it overestimated 
high risk for blacks.29 
COMPAS’s corporate owner, Northpointe, quickly rejected such 
characterizations.30 After running their own statistical analyses on the 
same dataset ProPublica had compiled, Northpointe statisticians 
asserted that their results demonstrated COMPAS outcomes achieved 
predictive parity for blacks and whites.31 More specifically, 
Northpointe reported that black defendants who were predicted to 
 
 26 Sandra Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019); Christin, 
supra note 17; Osonde Osaba & William Welser IV, RAND CORP., An Intelligence in Our 
Image: The Risks of Bias and Errors in Artificial Intelligence 19 (2017), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1744.html. 
 27 Angwin et al., supra note 5.  
 28 See Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 673, 683 (describing big data-based risk assessment in a pretrial setting an 
example of the new wave of criminal court reform).  
 29 Angwin et al., supra note 5.  
 30 Northpointe rebranded with the trade name equivant (lower case intended) in 
January 2017. Press Release, equivant, Courtview, Constellation & Northpointe Re-
brand to equivant (2017), http://www.equivant.com/blog/we-have-rebranded-to-
equivant.  
 31 William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity 
and Predictive Parity 2-3 (July 8, 2016), http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-
989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf.  
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recidivate did reoffend at a “slightly” higher rate than whites (63% 
versus 59%, respectively).32 
It turns out that the dispute is founded upon contrasting measures 
of algorithmic fairness. ProPublica touted the false positive rate. 
Northpointe instead preferred the alternative measure called the 
positive predictive value.33 Still, the potential that a popular risk tool 
used in a criminal justice setting to inform release decisions is racist 
(or not) attracted much attention.34 And, because of the contrary 
conclusions on that question, academics, practitioners, and the media 
were evidently confused.35 One of the purposes of this paper is to offer 
appropriate explanations to relieve such misunderstandings. But for 
now, perhaps a brief summary will suffice. The rates of reoffending 
between groups varied significantly, such that the base rate of rearrests 
for blacks was much higher than for whites in the underlying dataset. 
The obstacle is that when base rates between groups differ, the 
algorithm cannot achieve equal false positive rates and equal positive 
predictive values at the same time because only the latter statistic is 
heavily influenced by base rate differentials.36 
The subject of group-based differences in prediction is even more 
complicated than the few conflicting statistical measures that 
 
 32 Id. at 11, 20.  
 33 Tafari Mbadiwe, Algorithmic Injustice, NEW ATLANTIC 1, 18 (Winter 2018), 
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/algorithmic-injustice; see also Alexandria 
Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism 
Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 155 (2017). 
 34 E.g., Catherine Matacic, Are Algorithms Good Judges?: People are as Good as 
Machines in Predicting Rearrest, 359 SCI. 263, 263 (2018); Carole Piovesan & Vivian 
Ntiri, Adjudication by Algorithm: The Risks and Benefits of Artificial Intelligence in 
Judicial Decision-Making, ADVOCATES J. 42-43 (Spring 2018); Adam Liptak, Sent to 
Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-
secret-algorithms.html. 
 35 E.g., Taylor R. Moore, Ctr. Democracy & Tech., Trade Secrets and Algorithms as 
Barriers to Social Justice (Aug. 2017), https://cdt.org/. . .//files/2017/08/2017-07-31-Trade-
Secret-Algorithms-as-Barriers-to-Social-Justice.pdf; Jason Tashea, Risk-Assessment 
Algorithms Challenged in Bail, Sentencing and Parole Decisions, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2017 01:30 
CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole/; 
Joshua Brustein, This Guy Trains Computers to Find Future Criminals, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-richard-berk-future-crime/; Ryan 
O’Hare, Is Software Used by Police to Identify Suspects Racist?, DAILY MAIL (May 24, 2015 
07:51 EDT), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3606478/Is-software-used-
police-identify-suspects-racist-Algorithm-used-predict-likelihood-reoffending-biased-
against-black-people-investigation-claims.html.  
 36 Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the 
Art, SOC. METHODS & RES. 18 (forthcoming 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.09207.  
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ProPublica and Northpointe highlighted. Additional computations for 
algorithmic equity now exist within the legal and scientific literatures, 
albeit some of them being mutually exclusive as well.37 Several of these 
alternative measures of algorithmic fairness will be discussed and 
quantified herein. 
The next Part sets up the analytical plan underlying the mixed-
methods research reported herein. The overall intent is to tease out 
how ProPublica and Northpointe came to their competing notions of 
fairness, examine justifications for their choices, and then supplement 
their narrow perspectives on algorithmic equity. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
This interdisciplinary study of algorithmic risk prediction combines 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The analytical plan draws upon 
multiple sources of data, both textual and statistical, that complement 
each other for a more integrated approach. The qualitative component 
embraces critical discourse analysis as its methodological framework. 
A. Critical Discourse Analysis 
Discourse is communicative, yet it should not be taken at face value. 
Discourse analysts understand that people’s communication can be 
strategic in attempting to exercise control over mutual understandings 
of the issue at hand.38 Discourse analysis is thereby interested in many 
things: why text is framed as it is; why certain words are used and in 
what order; what the specific text implies about broader discourses; 
and how in the larger scheme of things the discourse reflects and 
conveys information about social structures and power.39 Discourse 
analysis is particularly suited, therefore, to communications research 
into argumentation.40 
Critical discourse analysis (“CDA”) extends discourse analysis: 
“Rather than merely describe discourse structures, it tries to explain 
them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social 
 
 37 Miconi, supra note 9, at 2. 
 38 Karen Tracy, Discourse Analysis in Communication, in 4 THE HANDBOOK OF 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 725, 731 (Deborah Schiffrin et al. eds., 2008). 
 39 Christina Schäffner, Discourse Analysis, in 4 HANDBOOK OF TRANSLATION STUDIES 
47, 48 (Yves Gambier et al. eds., 4th ed. 2013). 
 40 Tracy, supra note 38, at 732 (“[T]o identify how relatively stable aspects of 
meaning are acted upon by the shaping and changing power of context . . . . [using] 
forecasting principles which communicators use to make decisions about what to say 
next is identified.”).  
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structure.”41 CDA is acutely engaged in how discourse is deployed to 
maximize imbalances in power.42 Thus, CDA represents “discourse 
analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power abuse 
and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by 
text and talk in the social and political context.”43 
CDA can tease out how dominant players manipulate the text and 
context of public discourse with the aim of “controlling the intentions, 
plans, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies — as well as 
their consequent actions — of recipients.”44 The use of epistemic or 
ideological manipulation often instrumentally serves the speaker’s 
own interests.45 The powerful may dictate the dialogue by exploiting 
their guise of authority and credibility, particularly when the audience 
does not have the ability or knowledge to challenge it.46 Discursive-
controlling power strategies at times may simply be aimed at 
tempering the voices of others.47 
When a powerful group is relying on perceptions of its authority to 
control, repeated exercises in cultivating confidence in the group’s 
legitimacy may appear necessary.48 Recognized types of legitimizing 
accounts include authorization, moral evaluation, and 
rationalization.49 
On a microanalytical front, discourse control practices can employ 
tactical choices with specific lexical choices, syntactic structures, 
rhetorical devices, or narrative arrangements.50 For example, when a 
group perceives that another party’s message is challenging the group’s 
authority, useful lexical expressions can entail words or labels that are 
 
 41 Teun A. van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 466, 467 (Deborah Tannen et al. eds. 2d ed., 2015) [hereinafter Critical 
Discourse Analysis]. 
 42 Teun A. van Dijk, Critical Discourse Studies: A Sociocognitive Approach, in 
METHODS OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES 62, 71 (Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer eds., 
3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter Critical Discourse Studies]. 
 43 van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 466. 
 44 Id. at 472. 
 45 Id. at 470, 473. 
 46 Id. at 470, 473. 
 47 Id. at 470-72. 
 48 Theo van Leeuwen, The Discursive Construction of Legitimation, in DISCOURSE 
AND PRACTICE: NEW TOOLS FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS 105, 105 (Nikolas Coupland & 
Adam Jaworsk eds., 2008) [hereinafter Discursive Construction] (citing Max Weber). 
 49 Id. at 106-07. 
 50 van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 471-73. 
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judgmental in nature and meant to restrict how the other party’s 
message is perceived, both internally and externally.51 
Considering the foregoing, CDA researchers are keen to test the 
claims of powerful groups engaged in discourse from a validity 
perspective. More specifically, validity claims identify four attributes: 
legitimacy, truthfulness, sincerity, and comprehensibility.52 A key 
measure of legitimacy arises if the speaker properly recognizes and 
considers different perspectives. In terms of truthfulness, a particular 
strength of the CDA method is its evaluative component. The 
researcher may uncover misrepresentations which appear to protect 
the speaker’s own interests, while also maintaining the power 
imbalance.53 One approach for establishing that a discursive turn 
constitutes a misrepresentation involves exposing internal 
inconsistencies or contradictory positions.54 In sum, as a prominent 
qualitative scholar observes, “CDA is discourse analysis with an 
attitude.”55 
The CDA results will then be supplemented by algorithmic fairness 
calculations from a live dataset. Next is a summary of this dataset and 
the measures underlying the quantitative aspect of the study presented 
herein. 
B. Dataset and Measures 
The primary dataset for the quantitative piece includes individuals 
arrested in Broward County, Florida and scored on the COMPAS 
general recidivism risk scale after their arrests in 2013 and 2014.56 
Notably, Broward County is among the top twenty largest American 
counties by population,57 thus improving the potential for a large and 
 
 51 Id. at 473. 
 52 Jeffrey D. Wall et al., Critical Discourse Analysis as a Review Methodology: An 
Empirical Example, 37 COMM. ASS’N INFO. SYS. 257, 261 (Sept. 2015), 
http://elibrary.aisnet.org/Default.aspx?url=https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=3876&context=cais. 
 53 Theo van Leeuwen, Moral Evaluation in Critical Discourse Analysis, 15 CRITICAL 
DISCOURSE STUD. 140, 144 (2018) [hereinafter Moral Evaluation]. 
 54 Id. at 144. 
 55 van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 466. 
 56 See Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-
compas-recidivism-algorithm. ProPublica has generously made the data available for 
other researchers to access. Data Analysis for ‘Machine Bias,’ GITHUB (June 12, 2017), 
http://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis. 
 57 Matt Rosenberg, Largest Counties by Population, THOUGHTCO. (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/largest-counties-by-population-1435134. 
  
2019] Debating Algorithmic Fairness 273 
diverse sample set. The pretrial services division of the Broward 
County Sheriff’s Office has been using COMPAS since 2008 to inform 
judicial determinations concerning pretrial release.58 
COMPAS is a software application widely used across correctional 
institutions and offers a general recidivism risk scale.59 The COMPAS 
algorithm produces outcomes as decile scores of 1–10 with higher 
deciles representing greater predicted risk. COMPAS then subdivides 
decile scores into three, ordinal risk bins: low (deciles 1–4), medium 
(deciles 5–7), and high (deciles 8–10).60 
This study uses a subset of the data in which individuals were 
scored on the general recidivism risk tool within thirty days of their 
arrests and for whom two years of follow-up after release were 
available, n = 6,172. As the focus is on comparing blacks and whites, 
individuals who were not in those racial groupings were omitted, 
leaving a sample size of n = 5,278. 
III. RESULTS 
This is a mixed-methods study to better elaborate on the issues 
raised concerning test bias and disparate impact by race. The 
qualitative results from a critical discourse analysis of the 
Northpointe/ProPublica debate are offered first and then the 
quantitative results follow. This ordering is appropriate considering 
one of the critiques in the qualitative portion is that the main 
discourses fail to address several of the popular algorithmic risk 
fairness definitions. Quantitative results that derive from data analyses 
and reported herein fill that gap. The statistical offerings thereby 
supplement the qualitative discourse evaluation, provide additional 
information on the abilities of COMPAS, and contextualize further 
why various algorithmic fairness definitions can provide what appear 
to be inconsistent results. 
To begin, the qualitative component relies upon critical discourse 
analysis methods, as summarized earlier. 
 
 58 THOMAS BLOMBERG ET AL., VALIDATION OF THE COMPAS RISK ASSESSMENT 
CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT 15-16 (2010). 
 59 EQUIVANT, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 4 (Dec. 19, 2017), http:// 
equivant.volarisgroup.com/assets/img/content/Practitioners_Guide_COMPASCore_12
1917.pdf. 
 60 Id. at 8. 
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A. Qualitative Results 
The CDA results are divided among three general categories. The 
first provides support for how the ProPublica/Northpointe debate sets 
itself up as conflict speech. In consideration of space limitations, the 
remainder of the report is circumspect in two ways. Northpointe’s 
perspective is the main concern considering its inherent conflict of 
interest due to its ownership of COMPAS. Then the discussion and 
quantitative results hone on the COMPAS general recidivism risk scale 
rather than try to also cover the alternative COMPAS violent 
recidivism scale. 
Then, the second component of the qualitative study reviews the 
main strategies underlying Northpointe’s evident attempts to control 
the message about COMPAS and racial bias. The third category 
observes the discursive strategies in terms of what otherwise are 
important and relevant issues and subjects, yet which Northpointe 
expediently neglect. These omissions will then, in large measure, be 
remedied in the quantitative results section. 
1. The Setup for the Discursive Conflict 
In news stories and scholarly articles, the use of headlines or titles 
can present as an inaugural signal of a structural scheme meant to 
persuade the reader towards the author’s predetermined conclusion.61 
It is relatively easy to establish that ProPublica and Northpointe at the 
outset are engaging in conflict speech in which each is attempting 
through its discourses to exercise control over public understandings 
about bias in the COMPAS algorithm.62 ProPublica begins the 
exchange, crafting a title to its initial report evidently designed to grab 
attention: “Machine Bias: There’s software used across the country to 
predict future criminals. And it’s biased against blacks.”63 Here, 
ProPublica’s initial publication engages the socially powerful narrative 
of racial discrimination.64 Northpointe’s quick response was to post a 
document on its corporate website, utilizing a title to explicitly stake 
its position, though in less provocative terms: “COMPAS Risk Scales: 
 
 61 See van Dijk, Critical Discourse Studies, supra note 42, at 72. 
 62 Communications scholars tend to define conflict in terms of incompatibility of 
goals and values, an expression of struggle between interested parties, and some 
interdependence between them. Linda L. Putman, Definitions and Approaches to 
Conflict and Communication, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT COMMUNICATION 1, 
5 (John G. Oetzel & Stella Ting-Toomey eds., 2006). 
 63 Angwin et al., supra note 5. 
 64 See van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 468. 
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Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity.”65 For the sake 
of limited space, the qualitative analysis herein refers to the two 
documents just mentioned, unless otherwise specified. 
This critical discourse analysis is rather unique in the sense that 
there is not one voice in the conflict holding dominating authority.66 
Instead, both parties enjoy a consequential level of group power, 
though the sources of power are distinct. ProPublica carries the power 
of the news media to direct discourse among the general public.67 
Northpointe’s guise of science as an analytical software company holds 
a different power, one that may be able to control scientific 
discourse.68 Northpointe, though, evidently understands the power of 
the media and the stakes at hand. On the first page of its response, 
Northpointe clearly references ProPublica’s conclusions concerning 
racial bias which, it decries, “were repeated subsequently in interviews 
and in articles in the national media.”69 
Northpointe, despite its descriptively sober paper title, adopts 
lexical choices bearing judgmental labels and narrative structures in 
an evident attempt to counter ProPublica’s advances, undermine the 
media group’s scientific abilities, and reauthenticate the COMPAS 
tool’s credibility. In the introduction of its response, Northpointe 
makes several proclamations. The first is to quickly and summarily 
establish its rival’s scientific failings: “Our review leads us to believe 
that ProPublica made several statistical and technical errors such 
as . . . wrongly defined classification terms and measures of 
discrimination, and the incorrect interpretation and use of model 
errors.”70 Notice that Northpointe’s attempt to retrieve authority here 
includes denouncing ProPublica’s efforts by using righteous 
terminology in variations of the words “error,” “wrong,” and 
 
 65 Dieterich et al., supra note 8. 
 66 van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 470 (“[M]embers of more 
powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the symbolic 
elites), have more or less exclusive access to, and control over, one or more types of 
public discourse.”) (citations omitted). 
 67 ProPublica’s involvement in a CDA paper is supported by its mission statement: 
“To expose abuses of power and betrayals of the public trust by government, business, 
and other institutions, using the moral force of investigative journalism to spur reform 
through the sustained spotlighting of wrongdoing.” About Us, PROPUBLICA, 
https://www.propublica.org/about (last visited Mar. 2, 2019). 
 68 See van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 469 (referencing the 
media and science as powerful resources with control over specific forms of 
discourse). 
 69 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 1. 
 70 Id.  
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“incorrect” — and all in a single sentence. It is evident that 
Northpointe’s document is attempting to mediate ProPublica’s text 
and the veracity of its message in the public forum.71 
Then Northpointe seeks, through the guise of its own authority, to 
manipulate the audience. The first page of its response states that 
“[w]hen the correct classification statistics are used, the data do not 
substantiate the ProPublica claim of racial bias towards blacks.”72 
Further, Northpointe promotes the legitimacy of its own moral 
evaluation, offering that “[t]he proper interpretation of the results in 
the samples used by ProPublica demonstrates that the General 
Recidivism Risk Scale . . . [is] equally accurate for blacks and 
whites.”73 Hence, its discourse discounts ProPublica’s statistical 
finding of racial bias by instead recharacterizing it as merely a “claim.” 
Then it quickly confirms the Northpointe team’s purportedly better 
grasp at statistical skills by using such legitimizing terms as having 
used the “correct” statistics and making a “proper” interpretation. 
Thereby, the conflict structure of the discourse is set. The 
argumentative positioning acts as a referential foundation for 
Northpointe’s discursive strategies identified next. 
2. Discursive Strategies 
In conflict discourse terms, a communicative style may strategically 
assume a rhetorical approach, even via exaggeration, to persuade by 
engaging “discourse through which a speaker presents an intact 
monologue supporting a disputable position.”74 Northpointe’s self-
interest as the profit-driven owner of COMPAS helps in interpreting 
the purposes behind such an approach. The company’s response 
contains several main rhetorical strategies to appropriate control over 
the specific discourse about COMPAS, as well as the more general 
discourse about algorithmic risk assessment. 
 
 71 Discourse can actively engage in ideological work, whereby it acts as a form of 
social action in power relations in mediating the link between text and society. van 
Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 467. 
 72 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 1. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Christina Kakavá, Discourse and Conflict, in HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
650, 653-54 (Deborah Schiffrin et al. eds., 2008) (quoting Deborah Schiffrin, Everyday 
Argument: The Organization of Diversity in Talk, in 3 HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
35, 37 (Teun van Dijk ed., 1985)). 
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a. Strategy One: The Choice of Classification Error 
Among Northpointe’s specific discursive attacks, the one that 
appears at the heart of the conflict concerns the choice of classification 
errors in assessing bias. to better understand what this scientific 
dialogue is about, a visual may be useful. An industry-standard table 
exists for reporting on the utility of a categorical model that uses a 
binary classifier and a binary outcome — for purposes here, this 
entails a classifier of high risk (yes/no) and an outcome of committing 
a recidivist act (yes/no). The model is called a contingency table and is 
represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: A 2 × 2 Contingency Table 
 Outcome 
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A contingency table is useful to calculate at least four different 
classification statistics. Two of these are the False Positive Rate 
(“FPR”) and the False Negative Rate (“FNR”), which are derived 
vertically by column; they represent retrospective measures in which 
risk predictions from a tool are observed for the groups of known 
recidivists and non-recidivists, respectively. The FPR asks: of those 
who were not recidivists, what percentage of them were erroneously 
classified as high risk? The FNR asks: of the recidivists, what 
percentage of them were incorrectly classified as low risk? Alternative 
terminology includes specificity, which is the reciprocal of the FPR 
(i.e., 1 − FPR), and sensitivity, which is the reciprocal of the FNR (1 − 
FNR). The definitions of sensitivity and specificity will be useful in 
later discussion. 
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In contrast, the Positive Predictive Value (“PPV”) and the Negative 
Predictive Value (“NPV”) are calculated horizontally. These are 
predictive in nature in that they focus on the groups predicted by the 
tool to recidivate or not, and then calculate the percentage who 
actually recidivated or not, respectively. Hence, the PPV asks: of the 
persons testing positive (i.e., high risk), what percentage of them 
recidivated? NPV asks: of persons testing negative (i.e., low risk), 
what percentage of them did not recidivate? 
The equations in Figure 2 apply to the foregoing classification 
statistics: 
Figure 2: Classification Equations 
FPR =  
FP
FP + TN
 FNR =
FN
FN + TP
 
Specificity = 1 − FPR Sensitivity = 1 − FNR 
PPV =
TP
TP + FP
 NPV =
TN
TN + FN
 
 
Contingency table classification statistics require that the sample be 
divided into two groupings: one representing individuals predicted to 
be recidivists and the other non-recidivists. The discourses here 
generally use the COMPAS decile score of 5 as the cut point for this 
dichotomy, such that deciles of 1–4 are designated low risk and deciles 
5–10 as high risk. Unless otherwise stated, the classification equation 
results use this cut point 5. 
Importantly, the reason to clearly distinguish the FPR/FNRs, on the 
one hand, from the PPV/NPVs, on the other hand, for the Broward 
County dataset becomes evident. According to ProPublica, the FPR for 
blacks versus whites was 45% and 24%, respectively, while the FNR 
for blacks versus whites was 28% and 48%, respectively.75 These 
differentials are large: for blacks the FPR is 21 percentage points 
higher than whites and its FNR is 20 percentage points lower than 
whites. In other words, the tool on these measures overestimated 
recidivism for blacks but overestimated non-recidivism for whites. 
In contrast, according to Northpointe, the PPV for blacks versus 
whites was 63% as compared to 59%, respectively.76 And the NPV for 
 
 75 Angwin et al., supra note 5. 
 76 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 20. 
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blacks was 65% compared to 71% for whites.77 The rate differentials 
here are obviously much smaller, whereby for blacks the PPV is 4 
percentage points higher than whites and the NPV is 6 percentage 
points lower. Thus, the tool was more accurate at predicting 
recidivism for blacks, but better at predicting non-recidivism for 
whites. 
Overall, Northpointe’s preference for PPVs and NPVs is pragmatic in 
serving its own interests.78 The smaller PPV/NPV differentials serve to 
downplay racial contrasts. Moreover, the single digit disparities in 
PPV/NPVs seem to empower Northpointe to assert that these are 
“evidence of predictive parity” of the scale for blacks and whites.79 
Northpointe uses discursive rationalization for this assertion. The 
company’s overall rhetorical choice is to conceptualize the four 
classification statistics in the contingency table into two sets. The 
company labels the FPRs and FNRs as “Model Errors.”80 The PPVs and 
NPVs are accuracy statistics, and thus to render them compatible as 
error terms, their complements are used, as in 1 − PPV and 1 − NPV, 
respectively. Northpoint therefore labels these latter complementary 
terms as “Target Population Errors.”81 The distinction underlies 
Northpointe’s discounting the FPR/FNR statistics which supported 
racial disparities in ProPublica’s report (i.e., “Model Errors”) in favor 
of the PPV/NPV metrics that indicate racial equity and promoted by 
Northpointe (i.e., “Target Population Errors,” which, again, are the 
complements of PPV and NPV). 
It is notable that in its argumentation on this matter, Northpointe 
draws on what the CDA literature refers to as the strategic 
employment of “implications” and “presuppositions.”82 These define 
semantic presentations of power that surreptitiously put forward 
concepts as if they were recognized facts, but that may actually not be 
true.83 Here, Northpointe’s discourse submits “Model Errors” and 
 
 77 Id. at 20-21. 
 78 See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 101 (2017) 
(noting algorithmic tool developers have a natural incentive to make choices that 
improve predictive ability that may otherwise diverge from societal interests or 
contradict criminal justice policy); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data, 52 
GA. L. REV. 109, 136 (2017) (“Data brokers’ incentives are to make their models just 
good enough so that their customers can profit more by using them than by not using 
them.”). 
 79 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 20-21. 
 80 Id. at 7-8. 
 81 Id. at 8. 
 82 van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 473. 
 83 Id. at 473. 
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“Target Population Errors” as if they were terms of art in the 
algorithmic data science industry by repeatedly emphasizing them as 
capitalized terms and often in italics to catch the eye and bolster their 
seeming importance. Its pretention is that these are not actually 
industry recognized terms. Still, the strategy seems as though it is 
meant to bolster Northpointe’s legitimacy. In CDA terms, this is a 
form of personal authorization:84 Northpointe crafts original 
terminology to reorient the language of the conflict, yet without 
acknowledging its own engineering and without sufficient external 
confirmation. Indeed, a review of publicly available documents about 
COMPAS authored by Northpointe scientists fails to uncover any time 
prior to the conflict with ProPublica that these authors used the terms 
“model error” or “target population error.”85 
Nonetheless, Northpointe rationalizes the limits of the “Model 
Errors” as follows: 
Model Errors are of no practical use to a practitioner in a 
criminal justice agency who is assessing an offender’s 
probability of recidivating. The practitioner does not know at 
the time of the assessment if the offender is a recidivist or not. 
Model Errors cannot be directly applied to an offender at the 
time of assessment.86 
Northpointe argues that the PPV/NPVs, instead, have “clinical value” 
and “predictive value” because they are prospective in nature.87 
Northpointe’s discourse deploys further disparaging words to 
undermine ProPublica’s scientific competence in the matter. For 
instance, Northpointe proclaims that ProPublica’s reliance on the 
“Model Errors” were “mistakes.”88 Shortly thereafter, Northpointe 
 
 84 van Leeuwen, Discursive Construction, supra note 48, at 106. 
 85 See, e.g., NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE (2015), http:// 
epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/EPIC-16-06-23-WI-FOIA-201600805-
COMPASPractionerGuide.pdf; WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE 
COMPAS REENTRY RISK SCALES (2013), https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-
justice/EPIC-16-06-23-WI-FOIA-201600805-MDOC_ReentryStudy082213.pdf (presenting 
results on an outcome study for the Michigan Department of Corrections); NORTHPOINTE, 
COMPAS SCALES AND RISK MODELS VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY (2010), https:// 
epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/EPIC-16-06-23-WI-FOIA-201600805-
COMPASSummaryResults.pdf; Tim Brennan et al., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the 
COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment System, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 21 (2009); TIM 
BRENNAN ET AL., RESEARCH SYNTHESIS RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF COMPAS (2007), 
www.northpointeinc.com/files/research_documents/reliability_validity.pdf. 
 86 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 7 (citation omitted). 
 87 Id. at 8.  
 88 Id. at 6.  
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moralizes again, declaring that Propublica “misused” the FPR/FNRs as 
evidencing racial bias.89 Even more forthrightly, Northpointe 
affirmatively, and in more judgmental terms regarding ProPublica, 
states: “They were wrong in doing that.”90 
In so arguing, Northpointe engages in the legitimization practice of 
personal authorization again, here in the implied form of “because I 
say so.”91 The company offers little external support for exalting the 
PPV/NPV metrics while censuring the FPR/FNRs. Indeed, as will be 
discussed further below, the position is contrary to industry standards, 
as well as Northpointe’s own position in at least one other paper, 
which the company does not acknowledge. 
b. Strategy Two: The Choice of Accuracy Equity Measure 
After justifying its preferred statistics of the PPV/NPVs to refute the 
claim of racial bias, Northpointe then seeks to exhibit COMPAS’s 
accuracy through a statistic known as the “area under the curve: 
(“AUC”). Northpointe characterizes the AUC as “one of the most 
widely used measures of diagnostic accuracy.”92 This rationalization to 
promote the AUC is in CDA language a type of “authority of 
conformity” based on its being a popular practice (as in “everybody’s 
doing it”).93 The company acknowledges that the AUC is derived from 
a statistical plotting of true positive rates and false positive rates across 
a risk tool’s scores.94 In other words, the AUC is based on the FPR and 
the complement of FNR (i.e., the true positive rate = 1 − FNR) 
statistics. 
Regarding the dataset underlying the debate, Northpointe states that 
the AUC results on the COMPAS general recidivism scale were .69 for 
blacks and for whites separately, thus declaring the tool to be “equally 
accurate for blacks and whites (equal discriminative ability) . . . [thus 
exhibiting] accuracy equity.”95 
The ability to claim — and to highlight by using italics — accuracy 
equity is important for Northpointe to legitimize its tool. However, in 
so doing, Northpointe’s discourse engages in an internal contradiction. 
In denouncing ProPublica’s use of FPR/FNRs to show differential 
 
 89 Id. at 7.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Discursive Construction, supra note 48, at 106. 
 92 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 7. 
 93 Discursive Construction, supra note 48, at 109. 
 94 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 23. 
 95 Id. at 3. 
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utility for blacks, Northpointe declares that those statistics were wrong 
and incorrect classifications, and without clinical or predictive value. 
However, these same statistics are the sole values used to compute the 
AUC. As Northpointe itself points out when specifically discussing the 
AUC, FPR/FNRs are “useful for summarizing the accuracy of a risk 
scale”96 as they “quantify Model Error” while their complements of 
specificity and sensitivity, respectively, “quantify Model Accuracy.”97 A 
related inconsistency is that Northpointe derogates ProPublica’s 
promotion of statistics that were not predictive, yet it promotes the 
AUC despite the fact that the AUC is not forward-looking in nature 
either.98 
The evident purpose of these contradictions is that Northpointe is 
attempting to rationalize two discordant positions. In sum, 
Northpointe wishes to (a) repudiate the values of FPR/FNRs 
presumably as they indicate racial disparity in that the rates are 
significantly different for blacks and whites, while at the same time (b) 
emphasizing that the AUC statistic — despite its reliance upon FPR/
FNR-related statistics — shows comparable accuracy for blacks and 
whites. Yet these goals represent an internal contradiction and a lack 
of comprehensibility, plus are further complicated in the next strategic 
rendering. 
c. Strategy Three: The Base Rate Problem 
Northpointe’s additional argument in elevating the so-called “Target 
Population Errors” over “Model Errors” regards base rate differences. 
Here, this means that the recidivism rates are significantly different. In 
the Broward County dataset, 52% of blacks recidivated, compared to 
39% of whites. According to Northpointe, “Model Errors . . . ignore the 
base rate of recidivism.”99 The company further explains that “Model 
Errors . . . are calculated separately for recidivists and non-recidivists 
and . . . ignore the base rates for blacks and whites.”100 Hence, 
Northpointe contends that “ProPublica focused on classification 
 
 96 Id. at 7. 
 97 Id. at 33. 
 98 Stephane M. Shepherd & Roberto Lewis-Fernandez, Forensic Risk Assessment 
and Cultural Diversity: Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions, 22 PSYCHOL., 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 427, 431 (2016) (“As purely a retrospective discrimination index (i.e., 
distinguishing which reoffenders were previously determined to be high or low risk), 
the AUC does not deliver a forward-looking predictive estimate (i.e., forecasting 
which participants will actually go on to reoffend).”).  
 99 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 10. 
 100 Id. at 10.  
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statistics that did not take into account the different base rates of 
recidivism for blacks and whites” and as a result such classification 
“statistics resulted in false assertions in their article.”101 In contrast, 
Northpointe highlights that its analysis is the true portrayal of 
COMPAS’s abilities whereby the “Target Population Errors” (utilizing 
the complements of PPV and NPV) are the “correct classification 
statistics” by accounting for base rate differences between groups.102 
However, Northpointe contradicts itself again. Recall that the AUC 
is derived from FPR/FNRs, specifically Sensitivity and 1 − 
Specificity.103 When Northpointe discusses the AUC specifically, it 
inexplicably argues that “Sensitivity and Specificity can change as the 
base rate changes” and that “false positive rates increase[] with 
increasing base rate.”104 Evidently, this change of position was to allow 
Northpointe to account for the differences in sensitivity and specificity 
between blacks and whites as it at one point blames the disparities on 
the differences in base rates between the groups: “Differences in the 
base rates of blacks and whites for general recidivism (0.51 vs. 
0.39) . . . in the [ProPublica] samples strongly effected the Sensitivity 
and Specificity tradeoffs observed in the [ProPublica] study.”105 Still, 
Northpointe’s dueling strategies can further be understood by 
revealing certain omissions in Northpointe’s response. 
3. Omissions 
Discourse analysts are also interested in what is absent or somehow 
missing from the rhetoric.106 Herein are noted four examples of 
significant omissions in Northpointe’s monologue that signify taking a 
disputable position without so conceding.107 
 
 101 Id. at 1. In another part of the document, Northpointe basically repeats the 
point: “Obviously these model statistics (operating characteristics) do not depend on 
the base rate of recidivism.” Id. at 33. 
 102 Id. at 2. 
 103 Supra Section III.A.2.a (Figure 2: Classification Equations). 
 104 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 33 (citing Mariska Leeflang et al., Variation of a 
Test’s Sensitivity and Specificity with Disease Prevalence, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 
E537, E539-40 (2013)). 
 105 Id. at 7-8. 
 106 van Leeuwen, Moral Evaluation, supra note 53, at 140. 
 107 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
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a. Conflict of Interest 
It is true that the authors of the Northpointe document do not hide 
their affiliation. Still, in the text itself the authors fail to clearly 
concede their conflict of interest in defending COMPAS. This might be 
understandable if the document purported to be a marketing 
brochure. But the discourse is couched in scientific and academic 
terms, and the audience may reasonably expect that statistics are 
wielded in an objective manner. Among the various critiques involving 
misrepresentations and omissions outlined herein, the unaddressed 
conflicts are telling. In CDA terms, it suggests a conscious hegemonic 
communications style by using deceptive practices in an attempt to 
control the dialogue about its risk tool.108 In a sense, the silence on 
this conflict of interest signifies a reactionary retort to a threat to 
Northpointe’s authoritative stance and the legitimacy of its prize tool. 
One of Northpointe’s positions in its response to ProPublica is to 
assert that COMPAS is based on “unbiased scoring rules.”109 Yet 
ProPublica reports that a Northpointe spokesman admitted that a risk 
assessment tool would likely have to include factors that were 
correlated with race as otherwise the tool’s accuracy would decline.110 
Any tangible reduction in performance cannot much bolster profits for 
the tool’s owner.111 
b. General Acceptance of ProPublica’s Classification Statistics 
Despite Northpointe’s disavowal of FPR/FNRs, such classification 
statistics are widely accepted in the data science and criminological 
communities for assessing the diagnostic accuracy of algorithmic risk 
tool abilities.112 Indeed, many experts indicate that any equation 
 
 108 See Wall et al., supra note 52, at 263. 
 109 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 8. 
 110 See Angwin et al., supra note 5 (emphasizing Brennan, the original creator of 
COMPAS, said “it is difficult to construct a score that doesn’t include items that can 
be correlated with race — such as poverty, joblessness and social marginalization. ‘If 
those are omitted from your risk assessment, accuracy goes down[.]’”). 
 111 See David Madras et al., Learning Adversarially Fair and Transferable 
Representations 1 (Oct. 22, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
arxiv.org/abs/1802.06309. 
 112 See, e.g., Paolo Eusebi, Diagnostic Accuracy Measures, 36 CEREBROVASCULAR 
DISEASES 267, 268 (2013) (accuracy of diagnostic medical tests); Christopher P. Marett 
& Douglas Mossman, From Ballpark to Courtroom: How Baseball Explains Risk 
Assessment, 47 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 443, 445 (2017) (illustrating the concept with 
statistics regarding baseball umpires’ efficacy); Shaffi Ahamed Shaikh, Measures 
Derived from a 2 x 2 Table for an Accuracy of a Diagnostic Test, 2 J. BIOMETRICS & 
BIOSTATISTICS 1, 2 (2011) (accuracy of diagnostic medical tests); Karlijn J. van Stralen 
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commonly derived from the 2 × 2 contingency table (see Figure 1) 
qualifies in appraising a tool’s classification ability.113 A recent paper 
reciting the common definitions of algorithmic fairness counted the 
times each of them were cited in relevant literature and found that 
FPR/FNRs were cited almost twice as often as PPV,114 confirming the 
general acceptance of these measures in the current algorithmic 
science world. 
Northpointe’s discursive approach to neglect this reality likely is a 
strategic one in its attempt to assert authority over the public 
understanding of its risk tool. The ploy could alternatively be 
characterized as a discursive misrepresentation to the extent that 
Northpointe expressly and repeatedly avers in its response to 
ProPublica that FPR/FNRs are inappropriate classification measures.115 
Northpointe’s position is more suspicious because of an assertion in 
a document it produced more recently. In its 2017 Practitioner’s Guide 
to COMPAS, Northpointe reviews various validation studies using 
other datasets in supporting the utility of COMPAS.116 In that 
document, the company clearly highlights that similar FPR and FNR 
rates (for the latter, using the complement of FNR) exhibited in a 
county sample in California were “providing evidence of model error 
fairness” which helped “demonstrate differential validity and 
fairness.”117 This positive use of FPR/FNRs contradicts Northpointe’s 
contentions aimed at ProPublica. 
Indeed, FPR/FNRs are known in the data justice literature on 
algorithmic fairness definitions as representing “equalized odds,” 
meaning that equivalent FPRs and FNRs between groups signify that 
 
et al., Diagnostic Methods I: Sensitivity, Specificity, and Other Measures of Accuracy, 75 
KIDNEY INT’L 1257, 1259 (2009) (“The sensitivity, specificity, PPV, and NPV together 
result in four different measures, each indicating the accuracy of the test. All these 
measures have different pros and cons, and they may be difficult to interpret. 
Therefore, one sometimes prefers a combination of them.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 113 See, e.g., Alexandria Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A 
Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 155 (2017); Sam 
Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical 
Review of Fair Machine Learning 5-6, 11 n.12 (Aug. 14, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00023; Sahil Verma & Julia Rubin, Fairness 
Definitions Explained 3 (2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ece.ubc.ca/ 
~mjulia/publications/Fairness_Definitions_Explained_2018.pdf.  
 114 Verma & Rubin, supra note 113, at 2 tbl.1. 
 115 See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 116 EQUIVANT, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE (2017), http://equivant. 
volarisgroup.com/assets/img/content/Practitioners_Guide_COMPASCore_121917.pdf. 
 117 Id. at 18. 
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the odds of such errors are equalized, and thus meet this definition of 
equity.118 FPR/FNRs are also referred to under the algorithmic fairness 
idea named “error rate balance,” whereby FPRs represent “false 
positive error rate balance,” while FNRs are “false negative error rate 
balance.”119 Experts have characterized FPR/FNR differentials 
involving a protected group as producing disparate mistreatment.120 
Thus, the implied portrayal that FPR/FNRs are inappropriate is not 
supported in the data science communities. From a legal perspective, 
too, it is unreasonable to discount FPR/FNRs. If either type of error 
disproportionately is visited on any particular group, disparate 
mistreatment may exist.121 Hence, Northpointe’s soliloquy on the 
irrelevance of any of the classification statistics is exaggerated and 
constitutes an attempt to obscure that its position here is disputable, if 
not firmly disputed, in the relevant scientific and legal communities. 
At the same time, as will be discussed further below, FPR/FNRs and 
PPV/NPVs are merely a few of the algorithmic fairness measures that 
now exist in the data science literature. 
c. Statistical Significance 
Another omission in Northpointe’s response should be noted. 
Northpointe purports to show predictive parity for blacks and whites 
through the use of PPV/NPVs, arguing that these statistics “refute” 
ProPublica’s claim of racial bias.122 Northpointe cites the PPVs for 
general recidivism as 63% for blacks and 59% for whites; the NPVs as 
65% for blacks and 71% for whites.123 Apparently, Northpointe implies 
that the differentials between the group rates on both statistics are 
practically similar, as it characterizes the differentials as being 
“slight[].”124 
However, it is common practice in the statistics world to test the 
statistical significance of any differences in proportions between 
 
 118 See Miconi, supra note 9, at 1. 
 119 Verma & Rubin, supra note 113, at 2-4. 
 120 See, e.g., Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment 
of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 95 (2018); Muhammad Bilal Zafar et al., 
Fairness Beyond Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact: Learning Classification 
Without Disparate Mistreatment, INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. (2017), 
https://people.mpi-sws.org/~gummadi/papers/disparate_mistreatment_www2017.pdf. 
 121 Geoff Pleiss et al., On Fairness and Calibration 2 (unpublished manuscript) 
(internal citation omitted), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.02012.pdf. 
 122 See Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 2, 20. 
 123 See id. at 20-21. 
 124 See id. at 11. 
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independent groups using a z-test.125 Northpointe does not concede 
this practice in its response and thus does not provide readers with 
such information. One reason could be that when one performs this 
test, the results are not in COMPAS’s favor. Perhaps appearing a bit 
prematurely, results from the quantitative component of this Article 
might still be useful here. Calculations of z-tests on the PPV and NPV 
differences between blacks and whites on the COMPAS general 
recidivism scale using the Broward County sample indicate they are 
both statistically significant (for the PPV, p < .01; for the NPV, p < 
.0001).126 Here, then, Northpointe exaggerates the lack of meaningful 
difference between the groups on these measures as shown by these 
significantly small p values. 
In sum, Northpointe’s preferred metrics for algorithmic fairness 
illustrate disparate impact on blacks based on the NPVs. These results 
counter Northpointe’s conclusion as, statistically speaking, there is not 
predictive parity for blacks and whites using Northpointe’s preferred 
metrics for algorithmic fairness. 
d. Additional Measures of Algorithmic Fairness 
Northpointe designed much of the debate surrounding the choice of 
classification statistics and, during the course of which, attempted to 
socially construct ProPublica as intentionally skewing the results. The 
document recounts that the ProPublica “authors selectively reported 
and interpreted only the statistics that they thought supported their 
claim of racial bias against blacks.”127 Further, ProPublica “used the 
incorrect classification statistics to frame the COMPAS scales as biased 
against blacks.”128 Notice the use of the word “frame” to likewise 
connote deviant intention on ProPublica’s part.129 Indeed, in a more 
recent document, the Northpointe scientists relegate the ProPublica 
report to a “political context.”130 
 
 125 See RICCARDO RUSSO, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES: AN 
INTRODUCTION 123 (2003) (indicating a z-test is appropriate to determine if 
proportions in two groupings are the same). 
 126 The p value, which ranges from 0 to 1, indicates the significance of the test. A 
lower p value provides stronger evidence. Here, it would mean that as the p value 
approaches zero, the test is more strongly indicating a difference between two groups. 
 127 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 24. 
 128 Id. at 2. 
 129 See id. 
 130 Tim Brennan & William Dieterich, Correctional Offender Management Profiles 
for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), in HANDBOOK OF RECIDIVISM RISK/NEEDS 
ASSESSMENT TOOLS 49, 64 (Jay P. Singh et al. eds., 2018). 
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Yet Northpointe’s preference for classification statistics that better 
support the COMPAS tool is clearly self-serving considering its 
ownership interest.131 Perhaps the strength of Northpointe’s negative 
discourse here is to serve as a warning to ProPublica and others to 
keep their voices down, a strategy recognized by CDA researchers as a 
ploy to maintain a power imbalance.132 
Notably, a significant gap in Northpointe’s rhetoric here is ignoring 
the many other definitions of algorithmic fairness that are available in 
the relevant scientific literature. This omission may serve to skew the 
public’s perception of the abilities of the COMPAS tool by not 
providing industry-standard, supplemental analyses. It also 
undermines the legitimacy of Northpointe’s position by failing to 
consider available alternative perspectives. As a result, the next part of 
this Article intends to fill this gap by addressing various of the 
alternative algorithmic equity equations. These quantitative results 
may also be somewhat of a check on the interpretive critiques 
contained in the CDA above by being more transparent about 
contentious issues in the algorithmic risk assessment field. 
B. Quantitative Results 
The qualitative analysis contended that the major reason behind the 
seemingly inconsistent conclusions on racial bias is attributable to 
divergent options on classification statistics. The statistical 
explanation for this seeming anomaly was this: when base rates 
between groups vary, it is impossible to achieve equalized odds (FPR/
FNRs) and predictive parity (PPV/NPVs) at the same time.133 The 
reason is that PPV/NPVs are a function of the combination of 
equalized odds and base rates (“BR”), as reflected in the equations 
provided in Figure 3. 
  
 
 131 Cf. van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, supra note 41, at 466, 472-73 
(discussing how speakers may manipulate discourse to serve their own interests). 
 132 See id. at 471. 
 133 See Miconi, supra note 9, at 2. 
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Figure 3: PPV and NPV Computations* 
PPV =
Sensitivity ×  BR
Sensitivity ×  BR + (1 − Specificity  ×   1 − BR)
 
 
NPV =
Specificity × (1 − BR)
Specificity ×  (1 −  BR) + (1 − Sensitivity  ×  BR)
 
* Where Sensitivity = 1 – FNR; Specificity = 1 – FPR; BR = base rate. 
In the last few years, scholars in computer science, statistics, and 
criminology have developed various definitions of algorithmic 
fairness.134 Some of these definitions overlap and may vary just by the 
name given by the particular field. Still, as with the example of the 
FPR/FNRs and the PPV/NPVs just given, several of the algorithmic 
fairness definitions are mutually exclusive or, as designated by 
statisticians, exemplify “impossibility theorems.”135 Due to the 
multiple, and at times incompatible, definitions available, a scholar 
has correctly observed that “any predictor can always be portrayed as 
biased or unfair, by choosing a specific measure of fairness.”136 
This Section advances additional algorithmic fairness definitions and 
provides relevant calculations. The point is to show how well 
COMPAS performs according to popular measures. We shall start with 
a rather straightforward standard. 
1. Statistical Parity 
Statistical parity exists when the percentages of offenders predicted 
to recidivate and those predicted not to recidivate are the same across 
groups.137 More specifically, statistical parity is met when across 
groups these calculations achieve similar results as provided in Figure 
4 (using the acronyms provided in the contingency table in Figure 1): 
Figure 4: Statistical Parity Equations138 
Predicted yes =  
TP + FP

 
 
Predicted no =  
TN + FN

 
 
 
 134 Berk et al., supra note 36, at 12. 
 135 See id. at 17. 
 136 Miconi, supra note 9, at 4. 
 137 See Berk et al., supra note 36, at 14.  
 138 Id. at 13-14. 
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The literature also refers to this measure of equity as demographic 
parity,139 equal acceptance rates, and group fairness.140 Any significant 
difference is said to qualify as disparate impact141 and adverse 
impact.142 
Using the cut point of decile 5, COMPAS clearly does not achieve 
statistical parity as it predicts high risk at 58% for blacks compared to 
33% of whites.143 Still, this algorithmic fairness criterion has been 
criticized as it is impossible to achieve without some form of 
affirmative action-based intrusion when base rates vary,144 as they do 
with blacks and whites in the Broward County sample.145 
2. Differential Prediction 
Differential prediction demonstrates group differences in predictive 
ability and its existence indicates predictive bias.146 Researchers 
examining group bias in psychological testing in education have, with 
the endorsement of the American Psychological Association, 
standardized a methodology to empirically confirm its existence.147 
Group bias represents test bias; in turn test bias is present if systematic 
 
 139 See, e.g., James E. Johndrow & Kristian Lum, An Algorithm for Removing 
Sensitive Information: Application to Race-Independent Recidivism Prediction, ANNALS 
APPLIED STATISTICS 3 (forthcoming), https://www.e-publications.org/ims/submission/ 
AOAS/user/submissionFile/30728?confirm=1d6331c2.  
 140 Chouldechova, supra note 33, at 155. 
 141 See Johndrow & Lum, supra note 139, at 25.  
 142 See Christopher M. Berry, Differential Validity and Differential Prediction in 
Cognitive Ability Tests, 2 ANN. REV. ORG. PSYCHOL. & ORG. BEHAV. 435, 437 tbl.1 
(2015). 
 143 In a separate analysis not reported in the text, the author found the disparity 
exists at the higher cut point of 8 as well, where 27% of blacks were predicted to 
reoffend compared to 11% of whites (we use the term “separate analyses” to indicate 
data runs that do not form part of the main findings and are additional yet derive from 
the same set of analyses by the author).  
 144 See Miconi, supra note 9, at 4.  
 145 Cf. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 686 
(2017) (“While statistical parity seems like a desirable policy because it eliminates 
redundant or proxy encodings of sensitive attributes, it is an imperfect notion of 
fairness.”).  
 146 See Christopher D. Nye & Paul R. Sackett, New Effect Sizes for Tests of 
Categorical Moderation and Differential Prediction, 20 ORG. RES. METHODS 639, 640 
(2016).  
 147 Nathan R. Kuncel & Davide M. Klieger, Predictive Bias in Work and Educational 
Settings, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONNEL ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION 462, 463 
(Neal Schmitt ed., 2012) (confirming endorsements also from the National Council on 
Measurement in Education and the American Educational Research Association).  
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errors exist in how well a test measures members of different 
groups.148 The gold standard for evaluating test bias involves a series 
of nested models of regression equations involving the test, the 
group(s) of interest, and an interaction term (test × group) as 
predictors of test outcomes.149 
Notably, Northpointe is clearly aware that this method of testing for 
racial bias exists. In responding to ProPublica, Northpointe reflects 
that the “standard way to test for race effects is to fit a model with 
recidivism as the outcome variable and risk score, race, and race by 
risk score as predictors.”150 This description depicts the gold standard 
for evaluating test bias just mentioned. Yet the company inexplicably 
fails to conduct such an analysis, despite concluding that COMPAS 
shows no racial inequity. This is a glaring omission that calls for 
correction. 
The nested models method detects group differences in the form of 
the relationship between the test and the outcome in terms of 
intercepts and slopes,151 either of which reveals differential 
prediction.152 The rule of thumb in the psychological assessment field 
is that a significant group difference in either the intercept or the slope 
represents that a single regression equation for the groups combined 
will predict inaccurately for one or both groups; in such a case, a 
separate equation for each group must be considered.153 Unequal 
intercepts or slopes signify disparate impact,154 without requiring 
evidence of any discriminatory intent.155 Selected researchers in 
criminal justice have recently begun to apply this methodological 
 
 148 See Adam W. Meade & Michael Fetzer, Test Bias, Differential Prediction, and a 
Revised Approach for Determining the Suitability of a Predictor in a Selection Context, 12 
ORG. RES. METHODS 738, 738 (2009).  
 149 See Jeanne A. Teresi & Richard N. Jones, Bias in Psychological Assessment and 
Other Measures, in 1 APA HANDBOOK OF TESTING AND ASSESSMENT IN PSYCHOLOGY 139, 
144 (2013).  
 150 Dieterich et al., supra note 8, at 19. 
 151 See Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Race, Risk, and Recidivism: 
Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 690-92 (2016). 
 152 See Meade & Fetzer, supra note 148, at 740.  
 153 See Cecil R. Reynolds & Lisa A. Suzuki, Bias in Psychological Assessment: An 
Empirical Review and Recommendations, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 82, 101 (Irving 
B. Weiner ed., 2003).  
 154 See Meade & Fetzer, supra note 148, at, 741 (2009). 
 155 See Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109. 
121-22 (2017).  
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practice of nested models to evaluate group bias in recidivism risk 
tools.156 
The nested model structure here utilized variables labeled as Black 
(coded as black = 1, white = 0), the COMPAS decile score, and an 
interaction between them as Black × COMPAS decile score. A four-
model structure is employed with the outcome variable being 
recidivism. The results are compiled in Table 1. 
Table 1: Logistic Regressions Predicting the Odds of General 
Recidivism 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Black  1.710***  ---  1.140*  1.187 
Decile  ---  1.327***  1.319***  1.327*** 
Black×Decile 
Interaction 
 ---  ---  ---  0.991 
Constant  0.642  0.239  0.227   0.222  
-2LL 7209.06 6553.13 6548.77 6548.62 
ϗ2  89.35 745.28  749.64  749.79 
n=5,278     
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Coefficients represent 
odds ratios. 
Model 1 signifies that the odds of recidivism for blacks are 71% 
higher than for whites with no controls. This finding is consistent with 
the higher base rate for blacks. Model 2 establishes the utility of 
COMPAS in that the odds of recidivism increase by 33% for every one 
decile increase in COMPAS score. 
The higher intercept indicated in Model 3 for blacks is statistically 
significant. It signifies underprediction for blacks and demonstrates 
test bias. Though, the lack of a statistically significant interaction in 
Model 4 (i.e., Black × Decile) means that there is not bias in the slope. 
The Model 4 finding indicates that COMPAS decile scores carry 
basically the same strength of prediction as deciles increase for both 
blacks and whites. In sum, using the best practices model for test bias, 
COMPAS is positive for test bias based on race, though in a manner 
that advantages blacks. These results are relatively compatible with the 
PPV/NPV results trumpeted by Northpointe. 
 
 156 See, e.g., Jennifer Skeem et al., Gender, Risk, Assessment, and Sanctioning: The 
Cost of Treating Women Like Men, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 580, 585 (2016) (risk 
assessment of men and women).  
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3. Calibration 
Calibration concerns absolute predictive accuracy in terms of how 
accurately a tool statistically estimates the outcome of interest.157 A 
tool is well-calibrated in the first instance and then across groups “if 
the algorithm identifies a set of people as having a probability z of 
constituting positive instances, then approximately a z fraction of this 
set should indeed be positive instances. Moreover, this condition 
should also hold when applied separately in each group.”158 
For COMPAS, the tool is not well-calibrated for either group. At cut 
point 5, the tool predicted that 58% of blacks would reoffend, but only 
52% did. The direction was the opposite for whites, whereby the tool 
predicted that 33% would reoffend, but 39% overall did.159 These 
results indicate disparities in calibration ability based on race and that 
the algorithm is calibrated harsher for blacks than whites. 
Data scientists indicate this result is a consequence of having similar 
PPV/NPVs whereby calibration tends to suffer in the face of group 
base rate differentials.160 The algorithm is calibrated harsher on the 
group with the higher base rate, being blacks in this study. 
One reason that the calibration result here shows bias against 
blacks, while the results of the test bias models in the differential 
prediction section indicated the bias there favored blacks, may be 
differences in the measurement level of the predictor: the former was 
based on a single cut point (high risk versus low risk) while the test 
bias method used scores across the ten deciles. In other words, the two 
equity definitions used a dichotomous and a continuous variable, 
respectively, of COMPAS scoring. 
4. Mean Score Differences 
An alternative algorithmic fairness condition references the concept 
of “balance for the positive class.” It requires that the mean test score 
for those in the positive class — here, meaning recidivists — be the 
 
 157 L. Maaike Helmus & Kelly M. Babchishin, Primer on Risk Assessment and the 
Statistics Used to Evaluate Its Accuracy, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 8, 11 (2017). 
 158 Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 
2 (unpublished manuscript) (Nov. 17, 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807 
(internal citations omitted). 
 159 In a separate analysis not reported in the text, the author found that at cut point 
8, the recidivism rates remain the same (52% or blacks and 39% for whites). But the 
predicted rates are lower than cut point 5. At cut point 8, 27% of blacks were 
predicted to reoffend compared to 11% of whites. Thus, unlike at cut point 5, the 
predictive rate was lower than the actual rate for blacks. 
 160 See Miconi, supra note 9, at 3. 
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same across groups.161 Correspondingly, “balance for the negative 
class” requires equal mean test score for those in the negative class — 
i.e., non-recidivists.162 Table 2 presents mean COMPAS scores 
comparing recidivists and non-recidivists. 
Table 2. Mean Decile Scores for the General Recidivism Scale 
 Recidivists Non-Recidivists 
Blacks  6.24  4.22 
Whites  4.72***  2.94*** 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Clearly, balances for the positive and negative classes fail. Black 
recidivists and non-recidivists receive significantly higher COMPAS 
scores on average than whites. Mean scores for recidivists and non-
recidivist blacks are more than one decile higher than for whites 
within those same categories. Moreover, the mean score for non-
recidivist blacks is closer to the mean score for recidivist whites, with 
a difference of only half a decile. 
The higher recidivist mean score is consistent with the FNR being 
lower for blacks as the bar (mean risk score) is higher. Then the 
higher mean score for non-recidivist blacks is consistent with their 
higher FPR. Another way to convey this result is that as blacks have a 
higher expected base rate of reoffending, the tool will on average 
classify them with higher scores. As a result, blacks, both recidivists 
and non-recidivists will, as confirmed here, have higher mean scores. 
5. Treatment Equality 
Treatment equality considers the ratio of the errors, as in FN/FP or 
FP/FN, and thus is also known as the cost ratio of errors.163 This 
fairness metric is not as popular as the others yet still has relevance. 
For blacks the FP/FN cost ratio is 1.4 and for whites it is 0.7. Hence, 
for blacks, false negatives are more costly than false positives, yet the 
opposite occurs for whites whereby false positives are more costly 
than false negatives. This means that blacks are being treated 
differently by the algorithm whereby a false negative is a bigger 
mistake for blacks. In other words, the algorithm is willing for blacks 
 
 161 See Kleinberg et al., supra note 158, at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
 162 See id. (emphasis omitted). 
 163 See Berk et al., supra note 36, at 5, 15. 
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to have 140 false positives for every 100 false negatives, thus 
indicating over-classification for blacks. 
If we look at the flipside, which is FN/FP, the cost ratio for whites is 
1.4. The algorithm for whites is instead permitting 140 false negatives 
for every 100 false positives, here meaning under-classification of 
whites. 
This definition of algorithmic fairness is decidedly in favor of whites 
over blacks: the algorithm is willing to assume a greater rate of false 
positives over false negatives for blacks, but the reverse is true for 
whites.164 The results here are not too surprising because of another 
“impossibility theorem” involving the existence of unequal calibration. 
As previously reported, differential calibration existed whereby 
COMPAS predicted a higher percentage of blacks would reoffend than 
actually did while the opposite was true for whites. The trouble is that 
“it is effectively impossible to achieve calibration if the cost ratio of 
false negatives to false positives is not 1.0. Indeed, calibration only 
makes formal sense when the costs for both kinds of errors are the 
same.”165 
6. Limitations 
Several limitations of the quantitative study should be mentioned. 
The single site limits generalization of results. This study relied upon 
archival data, and it is therefore possible for systematic errors to exist 
in data collection that are not observable on secondary data analysis. 
Recidivism outcomes were from official records and thus will not 
include undetected crimes. The dataset did not include interrater 
reliability scores that would confirm the dependability of COMPAS 
scoring across evaluators and over time. It would have been preferable 
to control for aspects of supervision as pretrial services and conditions 
may moderate reoffending rates, but such an option is also not 
available in this secondary data analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
The qualitative study reviewed two powerful players who 
discursively directed the attention of policymakers and members of 
 
 164 In a separate analysis not reported in the text, the author found that the results 
are slightly different at cut point 8 whereby for whites there are more false negatives 
than false positives. The FN/FP ratios are 4.8 for blacks and 10.8 for whites. This still 
means at the higher cut point, false positives are far more costly for whites. 
 165 Richard Berk, Accuracy and Fairness for Juvenile Justice Risks Assessments, 16 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 175, 181 (2019).  
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the public regarding the potential for racial bias by a popular risk 
assessment tool. The investigative media group understood the 
political power and newsworthiness of a charge of racial bias in a 
criminal justice context. In turn, the risk tool’s corporate owner 
attempts to mediate such dialogue by using its authoritative image in 
data science and through judgmental commentaries to undermine its 
rival’s authority. Northpointe took aim at ProPublica’s alleged 
statistical errors while also seeking to derail the publicity by 
reorienting the attack as politically-motivated. 
Both groups bear some responsibility in selecting and emphasizing 
the algorithmic fairness definitions that most suited their perspectives. 
Supplemental algorithmic equity modeling performed herein 
demonstrates mixed results, in large part because of the impossibility 
theorems whereby certain algorithmic fairness models are 
incompatible with each other in real world settings. The gold standard 
for test bias is positive (bias in the intercept) though, in favor of 
blacks. Nevertheless, other equity measures (i.e., statistical parity, 
calibration, balance for the positive and negative classes, and 
treatment equality) strongly support disparate impact in the form of 
overprediction for blacks. By ignoring these additional models, 
Northpointe, as the owner of the COMPAS tool studied here, is 
particularly engaged in ideological manipulation to protect its assets. 
With a profit interest, it is an understandable position. Still, this 
exercise confirms the need for careful attention by lawyers, civil rights 
advocates, and data scientists, underscoring the benefit of third-party 
audits of nontransparent algorithms. 
To be clear, this Article makes no conclusions as to whether 
algorithmic risk assessment tools should (or should not) be used in 
criminal justice decisions — though this query should not have a 
binary response in any event. Instead, it reiterates that algorithmic risk 
assessment tools, no matter how progressive, scientifically-informed, 
and algorithmically-sophisticated they may be, can still result in 
disparate impact. Hence, as civil rights groups and data scientists have 
recently warned, care must be taken with their use. 
